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ABSTRACT
To qualify for copyright protection under the current
Copyright Act, a work must, inter alia, be fixed in a tangible
medium of expression. This requirement is easily met when
a work is embodied in a historical medium of mass
expression like a printed book, photograph, or audio
recording. However, when an author departs from such
established media of fixation, the requirement can create a
more significant barrier to copyrightability. Three decades
ago, digital media provided one such challenge. Today,
authors and lawyers alike are pushing the conceptual
boundaries of communicative media, and this has led to
some controversial recent judicial decisions on fixation.
This Article contextualizes and explores the implications of
those decisions. It also points out some of the practical and
conceptual pitfalls that lawyers and courts may encounter
in similar cases as the limits of fixation are further tested.
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INTRODUCTION
Fixation is a key component of federal copyright law: it is what
separates protectable from unprotectable original works of
authorship. It is the reason why a novel utterance is not protected
but a novel sound recording is. While copyright law creates
intellectual property rights, the fixation requirement ensures that
the intellectual property right can be tied to a physical object. To
put it another way, an author’s work needs an avatar to qualify for
protection. The process of fixation merges “original work and
tangible object . . . in order to produce subject matter copyrightable
under the [Copyright Act].” 1 Only once this merger has occurred is
a work properly copyrightable.
Fixation is necessary because only fixed works are at risk of
misappropriation by copying. Copyright law is grounded in the
incentivization of artistic production, not mere creativity. As a
matter of policy, copyright encourages making and distributing
works that can communicate expression to others far and wide. Its
imposition of limited monopoly rights is interest charged on the
debt we owe to the printing press. The net effect of these
1

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
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requirements is familiar and fundamental to copyright law: an
expression only constitutes a copyrightable work if it can be
reproduced, performed, displayed, or distributed. Copyright
protects things that can be copied, not things that can be imitated.
The historically dominant media of mass expression are the
progenitors of the fixation requirement: printed books and
periodicals, paintings, photographs, film, and musical recordings
are the sort of media that copyright law has long championed.
There is a practical, if not a legal, presumption that works in these
media are appropriately fixed. But more difficult cases have
emerged in recent years as unusual media of expression have had
their day in court. These cases bring to the forefront questions
about which types of works copyright law encompasses. In
considering these questions, we must also consider, as a policy
matter, which types of works copyright should incentivize as
creators test the boundaries of authorship and expression.
I. THE FIXATION REQUIREMENT
The fixation requirement is defined in 17 U.S.C. §102(a),
which applies copyright protection to “original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device.” 2 Section 101 offers further insight: “A work is
‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment . .
. is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.” 3 By combining these provisions, the
2

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added) (definition of “fixed”). The statute also
requires that embodiment be in a “copy” or “phonorecord.” Copies are in turn
defined as “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.” Id. (definition of “copies”). Phonorecords, on the
other hand, are restricted to “material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be
3
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requirement seems reducible to four basic elements: (1) encoding
of expression (2) in a physical medium (3) that can convey that
expression to others (4) and can persist unaltered for some
appreciable time. Notably, only the first of these elements involves
creative activity by the author; the latter three are qualities of the
medium in which the author encodes the expression.
The fixation requirement can be satisfied in a number of
situations. The author can make the material copy before the work
is ever presented to an audience. 4 The author can make the
material copy while the work is first being presented to an
audience. 5 The author can even direct another person to make the
first copy. 6 In each case, the key is that the expression is preserved
in some persistent communicative medium, some useable vehicle
for later communication. This is what separates copyable (and thus
potentially copyrightable) expression from uncopyable expression.
A. The Origins of Fixation
For most of the history of copyright law, fixation has not been
an issue. It was simply an undifferentiated part of the authorship
process, 7 while copyrightable subject matter was confined to rigid
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device.” Id. (definition of “phonorecords). These definitions
accomplish little more than dividing acceptable media of fixation into (1)
audible media and (2) all other media of expression.
4
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “fixed”).
5
Id. (“A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being
made simultaneously with its transmission.”); see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 675 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding that simultaneous recording of a baseball game constitutes fixation of
the players’ performances).
6
17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “fixed,” noting that fixation may be
accomplished “by or under the authority of the author”); see also H. R. REP. NO.
94-1476, at 51–2 (exploring fixation in the context of a directed broadcast).
7
It was, in fact, Congress’s expansion of the concept of authorship that
necessitated the fixation requirement. In refusing to confine authorship to certain
categories of works, Congress chose to broaden the concept of a work. See H. R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–2. The fundamental qualities of the concept of a work,
it seems, were human agency, expression, and fixation. Id.
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categories rather than defined by flexible concepts and qualities.
The first U.S. Copyright Act, enacted in 1790, applied quite
specifically to maps, charts, and books only. 8 Congress extended
protection to musical compositions in 1831. 9 In 1909, the list of
categories was greatly expanded to include periodicals, prepared
speeches, dramatic compositions, drawings, prints, photographs,
and “works of art.” 10
Only when this periodic expansion seemed destined to continue
ad infinitum did Congress attempt to craft a more flexible solution.
This solution was to make the subject matter requirement
dependent on the qualities of its creation rather than on the
categorization of expressive products. 11 While Congress did not
abandon entirely the attempt to categorize works of authorship—
indeed, it expanded those categories yet again 12—it chose not to
confine copyright protection to its enumerated categories. 13
Suddenly, fixation mattered as a concept.
The historical media of authorship all required fixation, and in
an important way they defined the concept. They were media, but
they were a particular kind of media. They were media that
involved an encoding of expression in a durable physical form.
They could be distributed, experienced, kept, and reused. Most
importantly, they could be copied. Their value was intertwined
with their vulnerability. Copyright law incentivized their creation
by addressing the vulnerability while preserving the value.
But as technology advanced and the panoply of expressive
media expanded, a more fluid concept was required to keep pace.
Recognizing that “[a]uthors are continually finding new ways of
expressing themselves, [and] it is impossible to foresee the forms
that these new expressive methods will take,” Congress added the
fixation requirement as a sort of flexible gatekeeper for the
8

Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 § 1; see also H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476,
at 51–2.
9
Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 chap. 16.
10
Copyright Act of 1909, Public Law 60-349 § 5.
11
See H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–2.
12
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1–8).
13
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Works of authorship include the following
categories . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–2.
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protection of new media. 14 Yet, despite the flexibility afforded by
trading fixed categories for their defining conceptual quality, new
technology still managed to create confusion over copyrightability
as the digital revolution began.
B. Fixation in the Digital Age
Digital works presented two different problems for fixation,
one of technological literacy and one of categorical
characterization. Digital works appeared, at least to the untrained
user, to be intangible by nature. Since copyrightability turned on
whether an expressive medium was also a tangible medium, courts
were called on to determine tangibility. At the same time, the
emergence of interactive digital works—specifically, video games
in their industrial infancy—challenged courts to assess what
characteristics must be unchangeable to qualify as a fixed work.
1. The Tangibility of Digital Works
The question of tangibility was the simplest for the courts to
answer. Despite a general lack of institutional competency with
regard to new technologies, courts were able to arrive at a
workable solution by analogy. At least one early court that
considered the issue held that programs could not be fixed in
computer memory, likening such memory to building plans. 15 Yet
the legislative history behind the Copyright Act showed that the
development of computer programs and other digital works was a
key impetus for the shift from categorical protection to the flexible
fixation requirement. 16 Taking this into account, courts began to
look at the question more practically, and a consensus emerged
that most memory media were adequate media of fixation. 17 The
14

See H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51.
Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Grp., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 n.4
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (concluding in dictum that a computer program could not be
fixed in memory because the memory was analogous to a playback device, not a
tangible medium of expression).
16
H. R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52.
17
E.g., Tandy Corp. v. Pers. Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173
15
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key to these decisions was that humans could encode computer
programs—which the courts agreed were works of authorship—
onto the memory for later playback. While computer memory
operated in some sense as a playback device, it was the fact that it
could store a work for playback that made it an acceptable medium
of fixation. That made memory more similar to the historical
media of fixation—the media of mass publication—than to a mere
playback device.
2. Interactivity and Fixation
Interactivity proved somewhat more difficult, though courts
again ended up in accord on the issue. In Williams Electronics, Inc.
v. Artic Int'l, Inc., the Third Circuit considered whether an
inherently changeable work could be fixed. 18 The plaintiff in that
case, the producer of the early video game Defender, sued a
copycat producer for effectively replicating the game. Defender
had two modes: the “play mode” and the “attract mode.” The latter
consisted of a rotating series of set animations and sounds showing
examples of what the game was like when played. The court had
little difficulty concluding that this mode was fixed for purposes of
copyright protection; while the presentations were generated anew
from computer memory each time, they followed set patterns and
therefore were always the same expression. 19 The game code and
art and music assets were the sort of “machine or device”
contemplated by the § 101 fixation definition.
The “play mode” at issue in Williams was more problematic
because the actual order and arrangement of the audiovisual
presentation depended on user input. When a user played the game,
the arrangement of the art assets and the timing of animations and
(N.D. Cal. 1981); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 n.4 (2d
Cir. 1982); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d
Cir. 1982).
18
685 F.2d at 870.
19
Id. at 874 (emphasis added); accord Stern, 669 F.2d at 856 (“[M]any
aspects of the sights and the sequence of their appearance remain constant
during each play of the game. . . . The repetitive sequence of a substantial
portion of the sights and sounds of the game qualifies for copyright protection as
an audiovisual work.”).
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sound playback would change according to player’s decisions and
reactions. The actual course of the presentation was not fixed in the
colloquial sense. Yet the court still held that the game satisfied the
fixation requirement, since the player was interacting with
copyrighted art and sound in set patterns determined by
copyrighted instructions:
Although there is player interaction with the
machine during the play mode which causes the
audiovisual presentation to change in some respects
from one game to the next in response to the
player's varying participation, there is always a
repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the
sights and sounds of the game, and many aspects of
the display remain constant from game to game
regardless of how the player operates the controls. 20
Essentially, the court held that the player’s “changes” were
only to the manner of experiencing otherwise properly copyrighted
elements. The game memory, code, and kit constituted a “device”
that aided the player in experiencing these fixed elements. So long
as the player could recreate the exact same inputs and timing
(which was nearly impossible), the same patterns would occur.
Even if exact reproduction did not occur, a “substantial portion” of
the presentation remained the same. The game was therefore
copyrightable, and the defendant was liable for copying it.
This same principle arose from other leading cases examining
the issue, and quickly became a widespread rule. 21 Fixation was,
generally speaking, no longer a barrier to the development of
digital works and the massive industries they spawned. The new,
flexible fixation requirement had passed its first big test. But that
test was not to be its last.
II. EMERGING BOUNDARIES TO MEDIA OF FIXATION
In recent years, a different sort of threat to our understanding of
20

Williams, 685 F.2d at 874.
See Stern, 669 F.2d 852; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F.
Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
21
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fixation has arisen. This threat is not technological, but conceptual.
Two cases—one involving conceptual artistry and the other
involving creative lawyering—have brought the fixation
requirement back into the limelight. This nascent line of case law
began with the controversial 2011 case Kelley v. Chicago Park
District 22 and was taken up later that year in the much less
heralded case Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers. 23 In Kelley, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided
controversial but nuanced reasoning distinguishing media of
fixation from media inherently ill-suited to fixation. In Kim Seng, a
California district court then took that reasoning and extended it in
an apparent attempt to simplify and apply it to qualitatively similar
media. While it is unclear precisely what conclusions should be
drawn from this emerging line of cases, or even whether the line
will be built upon further, the cases mark a significant turn in
fixation jurisprudence toward circumscribing media of fixation
according to qualitative characteristics of those media.
A. Kelley v. Chicago Park District
The beginnings of the new bounding of fixation began in
Kelley. 24 In that case, the Seventh Circuit considered whether a
“living art” piece comprising arrangements of planted wildflowers
was sufficiently fixed to allow for copyright protection. The artist,
Chapman Kelley, was a well-known Texas painter and landscape
artist who conceived of the arrangement as a public work of
conceptual art. He installed it in 1984 in Chicago’s Grant Park and
maintained it for years afterward. However, the wildflowers
became overgrown and the Chicago Park District heavily modified
the arrangement, reducing its size and altering its geometry. Kelley
opposed the changes and ultimately sued the Park District under
the new Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). VARA, which injects
into the Copyright Act limited aspects of the moral rights (droit
moral) that underlie much of European copyright law, 25 gives an
22

635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
810 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
24
See 635 F.3d 290.
25
VARA, codified at 17 U.S.C. §106A, implements a limited moral rights
23
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artist the right to prevent modification of particular kinds of visual
art, including sculptures. Kelley claimed that his “Wildflower
Works” was a sculptural work, and thus subject to VARA. But to
qualify as a sculpture, the work had to meet the general
requirements for copyright protection as well.
Fixation proved the primary hurdle to copyright protection of
the work. 26 Wildflowers were an unusual medium, one that needed
continuous maintenance to achieve any real semblance of
permanence. Kelley himself had described the concept for the
piece as involving the “management” of living elements. 27 This
management was apparently important to the conceptual
expression Kelley intended. Unfortunately, it was also fatal to
copyrightability, as it challenged the boundaries of permanence
and made the source of authorship unclear.
The court found the concept of fixation to be fundamentally
incompatible with the qualities of plant arrangements. “A garden's
constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed.
. . . [I]ts appearance is too inherently variable to supply a baseline
for determining questions of copyright creation and
infringement.” 28 Essentially, the court found that, because plants
are constantly growing, there is no point at which they can give
rise to more than temporary, uncopyable images. The issue was
with the very essence of the medium:
Seeds and plants in a garden are naturally in a state
of perpetual change; they germinate, grow, bloom,
become dormant, and eventually die. This life cycle
moves gradually, over days, weeks, and season to
season . . . . The essence of a garden is its vitality,
not its fixedness. It may endure from season to
regime for well-known works of visual at in the United States. Kelley, 635 F.3d
at 297. In 1988, the United States signed the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, but in several respects the country
subsequently failed to comply with the treaty provisions. One such provision
was protection of artists’ moral rights, protected by Article 6bis. Congress
enacted VARA to bring U.S. copyright law into compliance.
26
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 304–05.
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season, but its nature is one of dynamic change. 29
The court could find no point at which the plants could be
considered appropriately fixed, as they were always changing.
Something vital, something living, could not be fixed—the essence
of living is growth and mortality, not permanence.
Moreover, the court did not believe that a human could actually
author a garden. The court described a garden as something a
human could initiate and maintain, but not something that a human
could actually create. The creative forces behind the wildflowers
were not Kelley’s intellect and expressive act; they were the forces
of nature, acting as they always do. “Most of what we see and
experience in a garden—the colors, shapes, textures, and scents of
the plants—originates in nature, not in the mind of the gardener.” 30
Because human expression is not what gives rise to the visual
elements of the work, it is not an expressive work and is therefore
not subject to copyright protection.
Notably, the court did not disagree with Kelley about the
expressive potential of wildflower arrangements. Instead, the
conceptual rift between them was over whether that expression
came via a medium, from artist to viewer, or directly from nature
to viewer (with the “artist” confined at best to a curatorial role).
The court juxtaposed planted gardens with landscape designs. Such
designs, it noted, are copyrightable because they make the artist’s
expression reproducible. 31 A plant can grow on its own, but a
drawn design cannot.
The court implied that non-static expressive media can exist,
but they must be sufficiently static to allow for reproduction and
transmission of the author’s expression. 32 The court noted, for
example, that Alexander Calder’s continuously moving mobiles,
animated by wind and other natural forces, were sufficiently fixed
because the individual functional elements of the mobiles were
“obviously fixed and stable.” 33 Similarly, a Jeff Koons wire-frame
29

Id. at 305.
Id. at 304.
31
Id. at 304–05.
32
Id. at 305.
33
Id. This example calls to mind the video game elements in Williams,
individually fixed and functionally constrained by a set of rules authored by a
30
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sculpture covered in living flowers was deemed likely
copyrightable, as the frame should be enough to fix the
expression. 34 The operative question in the Seventh Circuit’s view
is whether the work is “quintessentially a garden” (i.e., an
“expression” of natural forces) or a work of art (i.e., a reproducible
form of the author’s expression). 35 Put another way, the court was
concerned with whether nature or a human author produced the
aesthetic elements of the work.
Wild plants, according to the Kelley decision, could not be
directed by a human author, and therefore they could not serve as a
medium of fixation. The court made it clear that its decision was
categorical and essential. It deemed “vitality”—and, by
implication, its less popular conceptual companion, mortality—the
operative quality of the medium. 36 A proper medium of fixation,
like the historical media of mass communication, would instead be
characterized by “fixedness.” 37 That is not to say that plants could
not form a component of a copyrightable work, but such a work
would have to be sufficiently fixed in another medium. This
reasoning seemed to put a new gloss on Congress’s intentionally
open-ended language, effectively limiting fixation to media (old
and new) that were in essence neither unpredictably protean nor
inescapably progressive.
B. Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers
What was not clear in the wake of the Kelley ruling was
whether courts might extend the holding to apply to other sorts of
human creator. See Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870,
874 (3d Cir. 1982).
34
It is logical to believe that a court would find only the non-living
elements of the latter work copyrightable, although the court here expressly
declined to offer its opinion on the issue. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305–06.
35
Id. at 306.
36
Id. at 305.
37
Id. The court thereby produced an odd sort of teleology of fixation: a
unfixable seed becomes an unfixable tree, but in death (or severance) it becomes
fixable wood—once dead, material that in life could not constitute a
copyrightable work may be formed into any manner of sculptures, paintings,
photographs, or books.
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inherently non-static media. The Seventh Circuit focused so
intently on the living essence of plants that its holding could rather
easily be limited to planted gardens alone. 38 But at least one court
has taken the bait and extended the Kelley holding to all inherently
perishable media.
In Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California had to decide whether an
arrangement of food was copyrightable as a matter of law. 39 The
plaintiff, a maker of Vietnamese rice sticks, had asked its
employee to arrange its rice sticks with some other traditional
Vietnamese foods in a bowl in a traditional manner. An outside
photographer then photographed the bowl, and the company used
the picture on its packaging. Because it was unclear whether the
company owned the copyright to the photograph, it claimed that
the underlying arrangement was itself copyrighted, with the
photograph constituting only a derivative work.
The defendant moved for summary judgment on grounds that
perishable food, like the living plants discussed by the Seventh
Circuit in Kelley, was an inherently inadequate medium of fixation.
The court extended Kelley, but in the process simplified its holding
as well:
Like a garden, which is “inherently changeable,” a
bowl of perishable food will, by its terms,
ultimately perish. Indeed, if the fact that the
Wildflower Works garden reviving itself each year
was not sufficient to establish its fixed nature, a
bowl of food which, once it spoils is gone forever,
cannot be considered “fixed” for the purposes of §
101. 40
The court keyed in on the stability requirement mentioned in
Kelley, seemingly holding that any physical form that deteriorates
38

Indeed, the court seemed to stop just short of limiting its holding in this
very way by favorably discussing the Koons wire-frame work. Kelley, 635 F.3d
at 305–06.
39
810 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (considering plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment).
40
Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
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cannot be used to fix expression for copyright purposes. Where the
Kelley court expressly declined to hold that physical
impermanence necessarily conflicted with the “sufficient
permanence” required by §101—indeed, it noted that “no medium
of expression lasts forever” 41—the Kim Seng court found
perishability dispositive of the fixation issue.
This extension was not made blindly. The court explained that
“the purposes underlying the fixation requirement—to ‘ease[]
problems of proof of creation and infringement’—apply with equal
force to a garden and a bowl of perishable food.” 42 The district
court, situated in the Ninth Circuit, was under no obligation to
follow Kelley; it looked to it only as persuasive authority. And
unlike the Seventh Circuit, the district court looked past issues of
authorship and agency in favor of the evidentiary value of the
fixation requirement. In effect, the court held that because food
could not remain stable long enough to be offered as evidence in
the event of an infringement claim, it could not serve as a medium
of fixed expression.
By this logic, “sufficient permanence” necessarily entails
sufficient stability to retain form and structure until the time of any
likely trial. While the court stated quite clearly that food was
inherently unfixable because it will “ultimately perish,” it could
not have meant that any physical form subject to eventual
deterioration cannot serve as a medium of fixation. Such a holding
would render historical media, e.g. photographs and paintings,
uncopyrightable because paint and ink will fade and discolor with
exposure to the elements. 43 This would also be true of sound
recordings made on audio tape, which degrade over time, 44 and
might even extend to electronic memory media, which degrade
41

Kelley, 635 F.3d at 305.
Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
43
See, e.g., Preservation: Photographs, NATIONAL ARCHIVES,
http://www.archives.gov/preservation/formats/photographs.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014). Yet the Kim Seng court even noted that a photograph is
“obviously” an appropriate medium of fixation. Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at
1054 n.8.
44
See generally Richard L. Hess, Tape Degradation Factors and
Challenges in Predicting Tape Life, 34 ASS’N FOR RECORDED SOUND
COLLECTIONS 240, 244–67 (2008).
42
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steadily with use. 45 In fact, if one takes a long enough view, no
physical form is truly immune from deterioration. Thus, the key to
understanding Kim Seng lies in its mention of evidentiary
necessity, not its discussion of perishability.
If evidentiary value is at issue, it would seem that the primary
requirement for fixation would be that a medium be at least
capable of maintaining communicative permanence for the term of
copyright protection. Yet this finds surprisingly little support. The
Kim Seng court cited to the treatise Patry on Copyright for the
proposition that evidentiary necessity supported the fixation
requirement. 46 That treatise, in turn, cited to Douglas Lichtman’s
2003 article Copyright as a Rule of Evidence. 47 But Lichtman
explained in that article that
the modern requirement excludes only those cases
where there never was any physical evidence of the
claimed expression; it does not exclude cases where
there was evidence at some point in time, but that
evidence was later lost or destroyed. Stated another
way, federal law requires that fixations survive for a
period of “more than transitory duration,” but it
does not require that fixations survive, say, until the
moment of litigation. 48
Oddly, Kim Seng seems to stand for exactly the opposite
proposition yet indirectly cites to the article for support. Because
of this, it is unclear where exactly courts looking to follow Kim
Seng, or at least trying to interpret Kelley in the same way, should
draw the line. If fixation requires something less than stability for
the term of copyright but something more than the rapid
degradation that characterizes perishable food, just how stable does
a communicative medium need to be to qualify as a medium of
45

Tech Guide: Storage Media Lifespans, ZDNET (Oct. 14, 2002),
http://www.zdnet.com/tech-guide-storage-media-lifespans-1120269043.
46
Kim Seng, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1054 (citing to 2 Patry on Copyright §
3:22).
47
Douglas Lichtman, Copyright As A Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683,
732 (2003).
48
Id.
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fixation?
C. A Look Toward the Future
It remains to be seen whether other courts will follow the trail
paved by Kim Seng and extend the notion raised in Kelley that
authors simply cannot fix works in certain media. The intuitive
allure of the idea is clear in both cases: how can you “fix”
something that can change? But, as the Kelley court recognized,
everything can and does change over time. Of course, categorical
restrictions on media are heuristically useful as well; there is no
need to determine whether a particular arrangement of plants or
food is sufficiently permanent if no plants or food can be. But is
this emerging approach really in line with congressional intent?
And, as a policy matter, does it impose problematic restrictions?
As discussed above, Congress intended to create a flexible
requirement that could adapt to new technologies and art forms.
The video game cases represented an effort by courts to
accommodate this intent. But categorical rejection of certain media
could potentially upend that accommodation.
One issue that may be on the horizon involves a concept that
computer scientists call “emergent behavior.” The concept
encompasses unforeseen effects of designed programs and
systems. More complex systems more frequently exhibit emergent
behaviors. 49 Artificial intelligence programs, extraordinarily
complex and difficult to predict with certainty, often exhibit these
types of behaviors. 50 In fact, emergent behaviors may well be a
key to producing artificial intelligence. 51 A human can program an
artificial intelligence, and that program would seem to be
copyrightable as a form of software. But if that software is subject
49

See generally Gerald E. Marsh, The Demystification of Emergent
Behavior (2009), available at http://arxiv.org/abs/0907.1117.
50
Pattie Maes, Behavior-Based Artificial Intelligence, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY, 74
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993).
51
See, e.g., Rodney A. Brooks, A Robot that Walks: Emergent Behaviors
from a Carefully Evolved Network, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, A.I. Memo 1091 (1989).
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to emergent behaviors unforeseen by the author, has it really been
encoded as a work? Moreover, is such a work permanent in the
sense that it can resist “deterioration” from the author’s original
vision long enough to serve as evidence of it? Aren’t these
programs more akin to wildflowers in a garden than to simple
programs like Defender?
From a policy perspective, it would seem advantageous to
society to incentivize creation of these sorts of works. Copyright
law in general is usually justified as incentivizing production of
expressive works, often for public consumption. 52 But if the
fixation requirement impedes copyright protection for work
deemed important, this incentivization will be suboptimal at best.
This problem may extend to artificial intelligence programs. It may
also extend to conceptual art expressed through gardens or even
food. If federal copyright law does not protect these sorts of works,
the states may wish to step in, since the protection of unfixed
works is not preempted by the Copyright Act. 53
While these concerns may not have been on the minds of the
judges who decided Kelley and Kim Seng, judges looking to those
cases as persuasive authority in the future would do well to keep
the implications of those decisions in mind. If they do not, and
especially if the courts further narrow the boundaries around media
of fixation, the courts may ironically return copyright law to the
place Congress left behind in 1976: confined to known media of
expression in a continuously changing world.
CONCLUSION
The courts in Kelley—which pitted an intransigent artist
against a cash-strapped municipal agency—and Kim Seng—which
involved dubious claims and seemingly unfair competitive
practices—may well have been looking for reasons to find a lack
of copyright protection. But regardless of their intentions, the
courts produced a new line of intriguing case law on fixation. In an
ironic twist, the concept that Congress hoped would provide
52
53

1 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:3 (2010).
2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:22 (2007).
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flexibility for protection of expressive works in unknown future
media may well prove a barrier to the protection, and therefore the
incentivization, of such works.
Lawyers and judges alike should be aware of the turn in
reasoning represented by Kelley and Kim Seng. The idea of
categorical medium restrictions provides fertile soil for novel
arguments and efficient rulings. But blind judicial acceptance of
the potentially tantalizing approach is dangerous. The implications
of the new Kelley line threaten to corral fixation, and therefore
copyright law, within fences established by history and intuition
rather than effective policy and legislative intent.
PRACTICE POINTERS


When challenging the copyrightability of a work in a new
or unusual medium, consider whether that medium is
inherently self-changing or so obviously impermanent as to
call into question its suitability as a medium of fixation.



When arguing against such a fixation challenge, consider
that both policy and legislative intent favor a flexible and
accommodating fixation requirement.

